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Shifting the responsibility for a necessary but costly action to someone else is often 
called Passing the Buck. Examples of such behavior in politics are environmental and 
budget problems which are left to future generations. Small group examples are (not) 
washing the dishes or (not) dealing with a difficult customer. Under the assumption of 
altruistic preferences, rational behavior in this game is derived and confronted with 
experimental data. By comparison, the sequence of possible decision makers in the 
“normal”  Passing  the  Buck  game  is  substituted  with  an  “expert”  who  alone  is 
competent to fix the problem. It turned out that the marginal probabilities of shifting 
the responsibility are in good accordance with the theoretical model, although with 
completely  different  parameter  distributions  for  experts  and  non-experts.  The 
structure  of  the  individual  decisions,  however,  is  best  described  by  a  random 
parameter model (Cox et al., 2007).  
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In  this  paper,  Passing  the  Buck  is  defined  as  shifting  the  responsibility  for  a 
necessary but costly action to someone else – who may try to Pass the Buck
2 back 
or to a third party. Passing the Buck is also used in the sense of “Shifting the Blame” 
for own mistakes or for actions which are morally questionable. There are countless 
examples  of  such  behavior,  most  prominently  in  politics  where  environmental 
problems  are  passed  to  later  generations  (though  it  would  mostly  be  cheaper  to 
handle  them  today)  and  where  necessary  negotiations  and  concessions  are 
postponed  by  making  unacceptable  take-it-or-leave-it  offers  to  one’s  opponent  
(Israel and Palestine). Philip A. Wellons (1987) and Jasmine Farrier (2004) published 
books with the title “Passing the Buck” discussing international credit policy and US 
budget policies. The EU is accused of passing the problem of political refugees to 
Central  and  Eastern  Europe  (Lavenex,  1998).  Blame  shifting,  for  example  in  the 
wake of Hurricane Katrina, is described by Maestas et al. (2008). 
 
Also business and social relations are believed to be plagued with Passing the Buck 
behavior. Lambert (2008) accuses firms of passing the problem of flexibility to labor. 
When customers complain about the product they bought, frontline managers often 
“react by ‘Passing the Buck’ back to the customer, to other members of the firm, or 
even to outside forces.” (Hill et al., 1992, p. 673). For individuals, Passing the Buck is 
often an option in order to avoid the costs of decision making or to defend a political 
position (Green et al., 2000). Problems of postponing and leaving necessary work to 
others  are  also  abundant  in  everyday  life.  Public  goods  as  a  clean  kitchen  in  a 
students’ apartment need service after every major usage and many conflicts arise 
from  relying  on  the  service  of  others.  Cautious  usage  and  individual  small-scale 
repairs/re-equipment  of  commonly  used  property  like  bicycles,  vacuum  cleaners, 
lamps (changing bulbs), etc. also pose the temptation to leave these costs to others. 
 
The moral requirement is to accept responsibility and bear the costs. President Harry 
S. Truman’s office deck had a sign on it “The BUCK STOPS here”, indicating that he 
was ready to decide and bear responsibility. This moral requirement and the many 
examples  of  Passing  the  Buck  seem  to  create  the  widely  held  belief  that  such 
                                            
2 The expression probably stems from poker where a marker indicated the person whose turn it was to 
deal. The player can refuse to deal and pass the buck. 3 
 
behavior is the rule and not the exception. But do we really have empirical knowledge 
about the frequency of Buck Passing?   
 
Experiments have shown that people are endowed with social preferences. They give 
voluntarily and non-strategically part of their income to other people in the Dictator 
Game as well as in the last periods of Solidarity Games and Trust/Investment/Gift 
Exchange games. People (partly) cooperate in Prisoners’ Dilemma, Public Goods, 
and some Oligopoly games though the equilibrium behavior of selfish people should 
be non-cooperation. Under the impression of these and other results we may ask 
how  severe  the  problem  is,  at  least  as  far  as  behavior  in  the  private  sphere  is 
concerned. 
 
As far as I know there is only a small number of investigations which are related to 
the Passing the Buck problem. Erev and Rapoport (1990) and Chen et al. (1996) 
investigate experimentally behavior in sequential step-level (threshold) Public Good 
games. Two of four or three of five players have to contribute to pass the threshold. 
Below the threshold no public good is produced, at and beyond the threshold one 
unit of the public good is produced. Insufficient or superfluous contributions are not 
refunded. Erev and Rapoport (1990) found that the sequential moves game leads to 
more efficient outcomes than the simultaneous moves game and that the information 
provided  to  the  players  in  the  sequential  game  matters.  Chen  et  al.  (1996)  are 
especially interested in the impact of “criticality” of a player’s choice on his propensity 
to cooperate. A choice is critical if it is necessary and possibly even sufficient for 
passing the threshold. When choices are critical subjects more often contribute to the 
public  good  than  when  choices  are  non-critical.  Bartling  and  Fischbacher 
(forthcoming)  investigate  a  Passing  the  Buck  situation  in  their  study  about 
responsibility. They find that many players delegate a personally profitable but unfair 
decision to someone with an equally strong incentive to choose this unfair option 
(they shift the blame), in particular if the decision maker can be punished by a victim 
of the unfair decision. 
 
Passing the Buck is related to the Volunteers Dilemma (Diekmann, 1985) which can 
be described as a step-level Public Good game where it is necessary to contribute 
one unit (= fixing the problem). In addition to the pure strategy equilibria where one of 4 
 
the  n  players  provides  one  unit  and  all  other  players  provide  nothing,  there  is  a 
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.
3 We could call Passing the Buck a Sequential 
Volunteers Dilemma which has to be distinguished from the Volunteers Dilemma with 
a timing dimension.  The  latter is  related to War of Attrition games. Otsubo and 
Rapoport (2008) investigate a   game where  all  players can decide in every of T 
periods to fix the problem. The game ends if one player fixes the problem or when T 
is reached without someone fixing it. Bilodeau and Slivinski (1996) and  Weesie 
(1993, 1994) investigate this problem with continuous time. 
 
There does not seem to exist a theoretical analysis or  a game with the structure of 
Passing the Buck  (=  Sequential  Volunteer’s  Dilemma).  In  the  next  section  I  will 
analyze  Passing  the  Buck  played  by  altruistic  players  under  complete  and  under 
incomplete information about the altruism of others. The generically unique equilibria 
are characterized explicitly. 
 
 In Section 3, I will report about an experiment with a sequence of decision makers 
who could choose to fix the problem or not. In a variant of the game only one of the 
players in the sequence (the expert) had the ability to fix the problem. Marginal fixing 
probabilities are well explained by the theoretical model, although with completely 
different  altruism  parameter  distributions  of  experts  and  non-experts.  Most  of  the 
subjects were required to make decisions in more than one position in the sequence. 
The  observed  individual  decision  structures  cannot  be  explained  without  the 
introduction of random influences. They are in accordance with a random parameter 
model (Cox et al., 2007) but cannot be explained by a random utility (McKelvey and 




Let us assume that a certain problem can be fixed in one of n>1 periods. The costs ct 
of fixing it are non-decreasing, i.e. ct  ct+1, t = 1, …, n - 1. In every period one of the 
n players t (denominated by the period t in which she/he is active) decides either “1” 
= fixing the problem or “0” = not fixing it. If t has fixed the problem no s > t can fix it, 
i.e. t knows whether or not the problem has already been fixed. The pay-off if t has 
                                            
3 Also asymmetric Volunteer’s Dilemma games are investigated (Diekmann, 1993) where no 
symmetric equilibria exist. 5 
 
fixed  the  problem  is P  –  ct for  t  and  P for  the  other players.  If  no  one fixes  the 
problem  all  pay-offs  are  0.  Let  us  call  this  game  n.  We  will  assume  altruistic, 
egoistic, or spiteful preferences. A simplification of Game n is the game n
t where 
only t is capable of fixing the problem. In this case, t is called an expert. 
 
Assumption 1: Preferences are described by 
(1)                                  ,              where xi = income of player i. 
We assume that, in cases of indifference, players fix the problem. 
 
Under this assumption the utility from no one fixing the problem is 0, if t fixes the 
problem his utility is P-ct+(n-1)atP, and the utility of r≠t is P+ar((n-1)P-ct). Note that a 
player’s utility is not affected by other players’ altruism (as in Levine, 1998). 
 
Lemma 1: In n
t player t will fix the problem if and only if 
(2)        
    
      . 
 
Proof: t’s utility from fixing the problem is                     while not fixing it 
yields 0.  
 
The assumption of non-decreasing costs implies 
 
Corollary 1: An expert individual who is the only one who could fix the problem, 
should fix it in periods 1, …, tmax (i.e. in games n
t , t tmax) and not in periods tmax +1, 
…, n. tmax may be 0 or n. 
 
Lemma 1 provides us also with the decision of player n in n if no previous player has 
fixed the problem. 
 
2.1. Complete Information 
 
Assumption 2: at and ct, t = 1, …, n, are common knowledge. 
 6 
 
Under Assumption 2, all players know whether player n will fix the problem. If she 
won’t, player n - 1 is in the same situation as n, etc. Let t = sk be the player with the 
largest t for whom (2) applies. Then player sk - 1 knows that sk will fix the problem 
and he has to compare his utility  when he fixes the problem with the utility from 
Passing the Buck and letting sk fix it. The same applies for players before sk - 1. 
 
Proposition1 (Subgame perfect equilibrium): There is a (possibly empty) subset S 
= {s1, …, sk}{1, …, n} with si < si+1 of players who decide to fix the problem if no 
previous player has fixed it. For sk, (2) applies. For all si S – {sk} 
 
(3)                 . 
   
For all t with si-1 < t < si  or t < s1,  we have 
 
(4)               . 
 
For t > sk or, if        , for all t, (2) does not apply. 
 
Proof: If (2) does not apply for any t then, by backward induction we can conclude 
that the problem will never be fixed, i.e.      . For        (2) does not apply for t > sk. 
The  cases  st-1<  t  <  st  (or  t  <  s1  if  k  =  1)  must  be  accompanied  by  (4)  because 
otherwise t’s utility of fixing the problem,                    , would be at least as 
large as his/her utility from Passing the Buck to sk which yields                 
     . For all si, however, the comparison of these two utilities requires (3) to hold.  
 
Along the equilibrium path players t < s1 Pass the Buck and t = s1 fixes the problem. 
Only if s1 Passes the Buck by mistake will s2 fix the problem. If all player are egoistic, 
(4) never applies, i.e. the largest t for which (2) holds, i.e. t with      , would fix the 
problem (or no one if        for all t). 
 
If at < 1 for all t, i.e. if no one assumes another one’s income to be more important 





Corollary 2: For  
(i)  egoistic or spiteful players or 
(ii)  at < 1 and ct = c, t = 1, …, n, 
 S is empty or a singleton. 
 
2.2. Incomplete Information 
 
Complete  information  is  a  strong  assumption.  While  costs  may  be  common 
knowledge, the strength of others’ altruism is unlikely to be known, in particular if the 
identity of successors in the game is not known. Then, (2) and (3) are fulfilled only 
with a certain probability. In the following, I will assume that others’ at is regarded as 
a random variable.  
 
Assumption 3: It is common knowledge that the altruism parameters at of players t 
are i.i.d. on         with the distribution function F(.).
4 
Assumption 4: All players are risk-neutral, i.e. they maximize the expected (social) 
utility (1). 
 
In the following, qt is the probability that t fixes the problem if no previous player had 
fixed it, Qt+1 is the probability that someone fixes the problem if it has not been fixed 
in period t and Dt+1 are the expected costs of players s > t.  
     
Proposition 2: Perfect Baysian Equilibrium behavior is described by a sequence of 
critical altruism parameters   
 . Player t’s strategy is t(at) = 1 (fixing the problem) if 
        
     and t(at) = 0 (Passing the Buck) otherwise.   
 , the probabilities Qt, qt, 
and the expected costs Dt are determined recursively from the following system of 
equations.  
 
(5)    
                                                    
                                       
                                            
4  We leave the question open whether the altruism parameters depend on the size of the group n. 8 
 
(6)               
 ) 
(7)                                                     
(8)                                                         
 
Proof: Player n decides as in the previous section, i.e. (5) coincides with (2). As 
there  are  no  subgames  in  this  game,  there  may  be  Nash  equilibria  (c.f.  threat 
equilibria) where player n need not move. But if he has to move, deciding according 
to  (5)  is  optimal.  Therefore  any  trembles  of  other  players  eliminate  such  Nash 
equilibria. Players t < n have to compare the expected value of fixing the problem, 
 
(9)                                   ,  
 
 with the expected value of Passing the Buck,  
 
(10)                                                 .  
 
The comparison of the two expected utilities results in the “fixing condition”        
  
with    
   from  (5).  Alternative  Nash  equilibria  where  player  t  can  differ  from  such 
behavior because he “need not decide” are again eliminated by trembles of previous 
players. 
 
Note that Qt (= probability that r≥t fixes the problem) is a decreasing function of t by 
definition. Formally, this follows from (7) because Qt is a weighted average of 1 and 
Qt+1, i.e. Qt is larger than Qt+1. It is implied by Proposition 2 that, ceteris paribus, with 
larger at a player will be more prone to fix the problem. 
 
More difficult is the question of how the position in the sequence influences a player’s 
decision (keeping his altruism parameter constant). Increasing costs decrease his 
propensity to fix the problem but the decreasing probability Qt that anyone else will fix 
the problem increases it. Thus   
  may be an increasing or a decreasing function of t. 
Figure 1 provides us with three examples. In all cases at is drawn from the uniform 
distribution on [-½, ½] and we have five periods with Ct = 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 for t = 1, 2, 3, 9 
 
4, 5. Proposition 2 allows us to compute the equilibrium altruism parameters   
  for 
the three cases P = 4, 10, 150. In the case P = 4, costs are large compared with the 
benefit so that player 5 needs to be extremely altruistic in order to fix the problem. 
Player 4 can practically ignore the small probability that player 5 will fix the problem 
(under our distribution only 12.5%) and will be guided mainly by his own costs when 
deciding  on  fixing  the  problem.  Because  his  costs  are  smaller,  the  critical    
   is 
smaller than   
 . We can proceed with this argument until t = 1. In case P = 150 we 
are in a contrary position. Only rather spiteful players 5 will reject fixing the problem 
(under our distribution only 27%). So previous players can rely very much on later 
players fixing the problem, player 3 even more than player 4, etc.. The case P = 10 is 
between the other two cases because there is a medium probability (50%) that player 
5 will fix the problem. Player 4 relies on this probability if he is not “too altruistic”. 
Moving backwards, for player 1 and 2 the reduction of costs is more important than 
the increase of probability that later players will fix the problem. Therefore we have 
increasing   




Figure 1: Equilibrium   
 , t = 1, …, 5, with ct = t · 2 and at uniformly distributed on  
[-½, ½].  
 
The examples show that we cannot predict the curve   
  without strong assumptions 










1  2  3  4  5 
P = 4 
P = 10 
P = 150 10 
 
benchmark case is provided by constant costs. In this case, the sequence of   
  is 
influenced only by the increasing probability 1 - Qt that nobody will fix the problem. 
Thus   
  decreases, i.e.  
Corollary 3: Assume that ct = c and that F(.) is continuous at    .  
If  
     
            , then qt < qt+1. Otherwise qt =0 for all t. 
Proof:  
     
             implies  that,  with  probability  1,  player  n  will  Pass  the  Buck, 
player n-1 will do it, and so on, i.e. qt =0 for all t. From  
     
              follows     
 . ct= c implies 
 
(11)  Dt = cQt. 
 
After substituting Dt in (5) we get 
 
(12) 
   
 
     
 
        
                               
 
As Qt decreases with t,   
  decreases with t, and therefore qt increases with t.  
 
Of course there are alternatives to the simple linear altruism model. Inequity aversion 
(Fehr  and  Schmidt,  1999;  Bolton  and  Ockenfels,  2000)  will  not  make  a  great 
difference but the consideration of reciprocity may be important. If it is player t’s turn 
to decide she knows (except t = 1) that previous players have not fixed the problem 
though they had lower costs than she has, and she may dislike the idea to be these 
opportunists’ fool. But if a player assumes an obligation for previous players to fix the 
problem  then  she  must  also  accept  her  own  obligation  with  respect  to  her 
successors.  Therefore  a  reciprocative  decision  rule  as  “always  fix  the  problem  in 
period 1 but never in later periods” seems to be inconsistent. 
 
Superior models may be inspired by the reciprocal altruism model of Levine (1998) or 
the dynamic altruism model of Bolle and Kritikos (2006). As a simplification of these 
ideas we could hypothesize that the altruism parameter for those who have Passed 
the Buck decreases to bt<at, i.e. fixing the problem is evaluated by P - ct + (t -1) btP + 11 
 
(n - t)at P where bt is a second individual parameter which is not known by the other 
players. This approach would yield a similar result as Proposition 2. 
 
A variation of the model without the necessity to alter the theoretical investigation are 
cases where many people are affected by the problem but only some of them (say T) 
have the power or competence to fix it. Then we can simply restrict the analysis to 
periods n–T+1 through n without any change in the recursion formulas of Proposition 
2. The case when there is only one expert who can fix the problem (i.e. game   
  , 
see above) delivers a useful comparison to the “normal” Passing the Buck game. 
 
Corollary 4: In   
   the probability      that t is altruistic enough to fix the problem is 
larger than that of player t in    , provided ct < P and t < n. In the case t = n both 
probabilities are equal. 
 
Proof: In game   
  ,                is computed as if t were the last period. Therefore 
          .  For  t  <  n,        
    
        
            
                 
    
   is  equivalent  to 
    –                        which is always fulfilled for        .  
 
At  last,  let  us  have  a  look  at  the Passing the  Buck  game  under  a  random utility 
assumption (McFadden, 1974; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998)
5.  We assume that 
a player’s utilities            from (9) and             from (10) are perceived by 
them only stochastically. Technically we assume additive random terms which are 
extreme  value  distributed.  Then  a  player  decides  for  fixing  the  problem  with  a 
probability 
 
(13)                                     
             





In period n, we have xn = EU(fixing) = P – Cn + an(n – 1) P and yn = EU(passing) = 0. 
This implies an average fixing probability of 
                                            
5 For an overview and critical comments see Haile et al. (2008). 12 
 
 
(14)                                                        .  
 
In period t the expected utilities of player t are 
 
(15)                                          and 
 
(16)                                                           
 
where        and        are  determined  by  the  recursion  formulas  (7)  and  (8)  after 
substituting     by      with 
 
(17)                      . 
 
Therefore there is a logit equilibrium of Passing the Buck which uniquely determines 
the stochastic behavior of all agents.  Equilibrium behavior is described by (7), (8), 
(13), (15), (16), and (17). 
 
II.3 Two policy questions 
 
If we have the choice, should we rely more on large groups or on small ones if we 
want that help is provided with high probability? In general Public Good games (Isaak 
and Walker, 1988) as well as in the Volunteer’s Dilemma game
6 (Diekmann, 1985, 
1986,  1993;  Franzen,  1995;  Goeree  et  al.,  2005)  this  question  is  discussed 
theoretically and investigated with experiments. The answer depends on whether the 
efficiency of the public good production is independent of n and, for a theoretical 
investigation, also on whether the social utility function is independent of n. In the 
Passing the Buck game, if we assume   and ct to be given and the distribution of 
          to be independent of n
7, then the crucial comparison of (9) and (10) is 
independent of n, i.e. we carry out the same backward induction and arrive at the 
                                            
6 If players are egoistic and play the mixed strategy of the symmetric game then the probability that a 
volunteer is found should decrease with the number of players.  This hypothesis is contradicted by the 
experiments of Franzen (1995) and Goeree et al. (2005). 
7 Such independence is assumed for the parameters of Fehr and Schmidt’s (1999) inequality aversion. 13 
 
same last period qn and Qn for every n. As Qt is decreasing in t, however, Q1 is larger 
for larger n, i.e. the problem will be fixed with a higher probability if n is larger.  
 
Another question is whether it might be a good policy to appoint an expert who is the 
only one who has the competence (and the duty) to fix the problem. If you know that 
it is personally advantageous for the expert to fix the problem then this is certainly a 
good policy because the problem will be fixed with probability 1. It is an empirical 
question  whether  a  randomly  determined  expert  has  a  higher  average  fixing 
probability than a sequence of non-experts.  
 
3. An experimental investigation  
3.1. The experiment  
 
Passing the Buck is played with three players/periods and the game tree from Figure 
2 (where utilities are equal to pay-offs), i.e. we have P = 8 and c1 = 2, c2 = 4, c3 = 6. 
As it is easier for subjects to understand the implication of their and others’ behavior 
when confronted with a concrete example of social relations
8 they were told a story of 
three individuals renting together a machine which is used sequentially by A, B, and 
C. Already on the first day a problem turns up which does not affect their gross profit 














                                            
8 That is the message of the Wason Four Card test when played with different frames (Wason, 1966; 
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Figure 2: The game tree of the experimental Passing the Buck game. 
 
The experiment was played as a classroom experiment in two sessions. The subjects 
were seated in a large lecture hall as in written examinations, i.e. with enough space 
between them to prevent communication. Every subject got a sealed envelope. After 
a verbal explanation of the task they were asked to open their envelopes where they 
found a written description of the situation (repeating the oral explanations) and three 
(in session 1) or four (in session 2) sheets of paper which were folded and clipped 
together. At the head of the description sheet they could read a subject number and 
they were required to choose a pseudonym. In the first session, subjects decided 
either in treatment 1a or in 1b or in 1g plus 2 (this order); in the second session either 
in Treatment 1b plus 2 (this order) or in 1d plus 2 (this order) or in 1e or in 1f. 
 
After subjects had read the description of the game, they were asked to open the first 
clipped sheet of paper. There they were required to decide in a certain position (in 
Treatment 1a as player A) and put the sheet of paper back into the envelope. Then 
they  were  asked  to  open  the  next  clipped  sheet  of  paper  where  they  found  a 
questionnaire requiring information about sex, age, faculty, and country of origin (for 
Germans, which federal state). After they had put also this sheet of paper back into 
the envelope they opened the third clipped sheet of paper where they were asked to 
decide in another position (in treatment 1a as player B). In the second session there 
always was a fourth clipped sheet of paper. Under treatment 1c (1f), a last decision in 
the position of C (A) had to be made. If the first session started with treatment 1g or if 
the second session started with 1b or 1d the last decision was on treatment 2 where 
the player was told to be the only expert who could fix the problem (her fellow players 
couldn’t) and she was required to decide in positions A, B, and C (this order). 
 
Treatment  1a  1b  1c  1d  1e  1f  1g  2 
Order of 
positions 
A, B  B, C  C, B  B, A  A, B, C  C, B, A  B  A, B, C 
Expert 
 
no  no  no  no  no  no  no  yes 
Session 
 
1  2  1  2  2  2  1  1, 2 




Table 1: Treatments. 
In the instructions, the players were told that groups of three would be formed and 
that they would be appointed to a group and to a role by chance. Their pay-off would 
be determined by their own and by their fellow players’ decisions. They were not 
described the exact matching procedure but were guaranteed that every decision 
had about the same probability to be decisive. For the practical matching we had to 
take care that players received a certain role only if they had made a decision in this 
role. In order to make also the expert decisions pay-off relevant, participants in the 
conditions “Treatments 1b/1d/1g plus Treatment 2” were either allocated to expert or 
non-expert groups. In the expert group only A or B or C was determined by chance to 
be the expert and only his decision in the respective role was made pay-off relevant. 
The subjects received their payment from a person not involved in the experiment 
after reporting their subject number and pseudonym. 
 
Why so many treatments with different orders and numbers of decisions? I wanted 
subjects to make more than one decision because only then individual differences 
and random influences can be disentangled. With several decisions, however, also 
the influence of the order of decisions has to be investigated. 
 
3.2. Aggregate results 
 
The experiment lasted about 20 minutes and payments were €6.50 on average. The 
reason  for  presenting  A,  B,  and  C  in  many  different  orders  is  the  possibility  that 
decisions  are  not  independent  if  they  are  required  to  be  made  together.  It  is 
important,  however,  that  the  subjects  see  themselves  in  only  one  position  in  the 
sequence  of  decision  makers,  develop  expectations  about  the  decisions  of  sub-
sequent players and (under reciprocity aspects) evaluate the behavior of previous 
players  who  (except  in  the  expert  treatment)  have  Passed  the  Buck  to  her.  The 
presentation of the non-expert decision requirements on different sheets of paper 
and  the  position  of  the  questionnaire  which  separated  the  first  and  the  second 
decision were expected to foster independent decisions. 
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Did the number and order of decisions play a role? Let us first have a look at the 
decisions in position B. There is no significant difference of repair decisions, whether 
B was the only non-expert decision (62%), the first decision (60%), or the second 
decision  after  deciding  in  position  A  (51%)  or  C  (51%).  Similarly,  there  is  no 
significant difference between A and C decisions when these were first or second 
decisions. The third decision, however, which is required in treatments 1e and 1f, is 
less often a fixing decision. (See Table 2.) This may be an indication that decisions 
are not completely independent. Some subjects may have got the impression that 
they  have  done  their  duty  after  one  or  two  fixing  decisions.  As  Table  3  shows, 
however, these deviations are relatively small (a reduction of 18 to 29 percentage 
points), concerning one of three decisions of 51 of 192 subjects or of  30% of the 
decisions in role C and 32% of the decisions in role A. Below, we will discuss whether 
to neglect this effect or not. 
 
  A  B  C 
Tr. 1  68/106*  104/192  77/108*** 
(all variants)  64%  55%  71% 
Tr. 1  38/55
+  48/80  45/57**
+++ 














-  12/25 
48% 




(expert)  95%  90%  68% 
 
Table 2: Frequencies of repair (not passing the buck) 
*(**, ***) different from B in a 
2-test
9 with p = 0.09 (0.02, 0.004) 
+(++,+++) different from third question with p=0.09 (0.03, 0.006) 
§ different from Treatment 1 (all variants) with p < 10
-6 
 
The distribution of individual decision structures is given in Table 3. A structure 10. 
indicates that the problem is fixed by the player in position A, that it is not fixed in 
                                            
9 A Fisher test is neither practical nor better because of the large numbers involved. 17 
 
position B, and that the decision in position C is not elicited or disregarded. Neither 
are the frequencies under the orders of decisions ABC and CBA significantly different 
nor those under orders AB and BA or under BC and CB. From the aggregate 
decisions under ABC and CBA we can determine the marginal frequencies for AB 
and BA as well as for BC and CB. The former are significantly different from the 
observed frequencies under orders AB and BA, the latter are not. 
 
Structure  111  110  101  100  011  010  00
1 
000  N 
Order ABC  7  5  1  4  0  2  4  2  25 
Order CBA  5  3  4  1  2  2  8  1  26 
Aggr. ABC/CBA  12  8  5  5  2  4  12  3  51 
Marginal   11.  10.  01.  00.  .11  .10  .01  .00   
Distributions  20  10  6  15  14  12  17  8  51 
Order AB  8  13  6  3          30 
Order BA  11  6  5  3          25 
Aggr. AB/BA*  19  19  11  6          55 
Order BC          10  4  10  2  26 
Order CB          14  3  12  2  31 
Aggr. BC/CB          24  7  22  4  57 
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Table 3: Frequencies of individual decision structures.  
* Significantly different from marginal distribution in a 
2-test with p = 0.046. 
 
Result 1: The number and order of Passing the Buck decisions have only a small 
influence.  One  systematic  deviation  is  that  third  decisions  are  significantly  less 
frequent  (18  to  29  percentage  points)  “fixing”  decisions  than  first  and  second 
decisions are. 
 
In the following we say that decisions in Treatment 2 are made by experts and the 
decisions in Treatment 1 by non-experts.  It made no significant difference whether 
the expert decisions were placed after Treatment 1b or 1d or 1g. 
 18 
 
Result 2: Corollary 4 is supported. We find that the frequencies of fixing the problem 
in positions A and B are much higher in the case of experts, and that the frequency in 
position C is not significantly different (see Table 2).  
 
Finally,  we  try  to  adapt  the  structure  outlined  in  Lemma  1  (for  experts)  and 
Proposition 2 (for non-experts) to our data. For the altruism parameters we assume a 
normal distribution and that it is common knowledge. Do the aggregate results, i.e. 
the frequencies  (qA,qB,qC)=(0.64, 0.55, 0.71)  for non-experts  and  (qA,qB,qC)=(0.95, 
0.90,  0.68) for  experts  differ  significantly  from  the  theoretical model?  
2-tests  are 
carried out after the parameters have been estimated by the 
2 minimum method. For 
the minimization in this and all following cases the Nelder-Mead algorithm is used. In 
the case of experts, we get 
2 =0.956 (df=1, p=0.328) at  = -0.026,  = 0.198. For 
non-experts we find a minimum of 
2 = 2.03 (df=1, p=0.154) at  = 0.328,  = 0.760. 
Thus experts’ and non-experts’ behavior can be explained by the theoretical model if 
we assume different distributions of the altruism parameters.  A joint estimation of 
expert  and  non-expert  frequencies  with  the  same  (,)  is  not  successful.  The 
minimum 
2 score is 14.38 (df=4, p=0.006) and thus indicates a significant deviation 




Figure 2: The estimated normal distributions of altruism parameters for experts ( = -












Result 3: The  observed aggregate frequencies  of fixing  decisions  of  experts and 
non-experts are both individually compatible with the theoretical model. There is no 
normal distribution of altruism parameters, however, which explains both aggregate 
frequency structures. 
 
The impossibility of describing the two frequency structures with the same model can 
be due to several reasons. First, the expert role may be different from the non-expert 
role and different roles result in different levels of altruism. According to the above 
estimation experts are neither very altruistic nor very spiteful. Their average altruism 
parameter is close to 0 and the variance is small. Non-experts are, on average, more 
altruistic, but they also differ much more than experts do. As a second explanation, 
dynamic (reciprocal) preferences might be assumed which can apply only in the case 
of  non-experts.  Both  explanations,  however,  do  not  suit  well  to  the  fact  that,  in 
position C, experts and non-experts show almost the same frequencies (68% and 
71%)  of  fixing  the  problem.  Under  the  assumption  of  different  roles  and  under 
reciprocal preferences this would happen only by chance. A last explanation is that 
random influences play a decisive role. We will discuss this explanation by taking into 
account the structure of individual decisions.  
 
3.3. The structure of decisions 
 
So far we were concerned mainly with the aggregate frequencies of fixing decisions 
in positions A, B, and C. Now we have a look at the structure of decisions by the 
same subject (Table 3). All data points are all from different individuals and thus 
independent.  
 
According to Corollary 1, experts should show a*A>a*B>a*C and thus only structures 
111 or 110 or 100 or 000 should be observed. From the estimated distribution of 
altruism parameters we can predict the frequencies of the different structures. 111 
results  if  a  subject  has  an  altruism  parameter  larger  than  aA
*  and  it  should  be 
observed  with  frequency  qA.  110  should  occur  with  frequency  qB  –  qA,  100  with 
frequency qC – qB and 000 with 1 – qC. (See Figure 3). We see in Table 4 that the 
experts’ observed frequencies suit relatively well to the predicted frequencies of the qi 

















        000           100            110      111 
 
Figure 3: The prediction of the frequencies of structures in the case of experts. 
 
 
  111  110  100  000  (other)  sum 
Predicted   69.1%  18.0%  9.0%  3.9%  0%  100% 













Table 4: Structure of expert decisions, predicted from the estimation of the altruism 
parameter distribution with  =-0.03,  = 0.19 and observed. 
 
  111  101  001  000  other  sum 
Forecasted   56.2%  0.019%  14.6%  27.3%  0%  100% 



























Table 5: Structure of non-expert decisions in Treatments 1e and 1f, forecasted from 
the  estimation  of  the  altruism  parameters’  distribution  with  =0.328,  =0.760  and 
observed. 
 
In the case of non-experts, the order of the ai may be different; in the experiment, we 
observed  qB<qC<qA  which  corresponds  to  aB
*  >  aC
*  >  aA
*.  The  predicted  and  the 
observed frequencies of structures in Treatments 1e and 1f are reported in Table 5.  
The non-experts’ decision structure shows major deviations from the forecasts, in 
particular the large difference in the “others” category casts doubt on the explanation 
of the non-experts’ behavior by “rational altruism”.  
 
As  the  “others”  category  has  a  theoretical  probability  of  0,  no  direct  
2–test  is 
possible.  In  the  following  the  rationality  model  will  be  qualified  by  assuming  that 
subject’s decisions have a random component, either in the form of quantal response 
equilibrium (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995, 1998) or in the form of a random parameter 
approach (Cox et.al., 2007). The fit of the quantal response equilibrium (derived in 
Section  2)  is  endogenously  tested  by  the  resulting  chi-square  scores  which  will 
suggest the rejection of the model “logit equilibrium with normally distributed linear 
altruism”. As an alternative, random “emotional states” (Cox et.al., 2007, p.18) are 
assumed, that are altruism parameters which change for every decision to be made.
 
 
For the logit equilibrium, the individual fixing probabilities qt(at) are determined by 
(13) together with (7), (8), (15), (16), and (17). The theoretical probability with which a 
subject with the altruism parameter a is ready to fix the problem in all three periods 
(category 111) is q1(a)q2(a)q3(a), i.e. category 3 should be assumed with a relative 
frequency of 
 
(18)                                  .  
 
The other relative frequencies are determined correspondingly. Now I try to adapt the 
frequencies Aggr.1, Aggr.2, Aggr.3, and Only B from Table 3 to the predictions of the 
theoretical  model  where  F  is  a  normal  distribution  as  above  and  the  random 
influences are measured by  from (13). Altogether there are 18 frequencies from 
four distributions. Because three parameters are estimated the 
2 statistic with these 22 
 
frequencies  has  18-4-3=11  degrees  of  freedom.  For  all  the  following  parameter 
estimations (of Quantal Response equilibria as well as of  the Random Parameter 
equilibria) again the minimum 
2 method is used and the minimum is computed with 
the  Nelder-Meads  algorithm. The  minimum  
2  is 34.01  (df=11, p=  0.0003), which 
indicates an insufficient fit between model and data.  
 
For the optimal parameter choice the number of theoretical frequencies smaller or 
equal  to  5  is  three  (=1/6  of  all  frequencies).  According  to  a  rule  of  thumb  which 
requires 20% of the theoretical frequencies in a 
2 –test to be larger than 5 this is 
sufficient.  Possibly  the  mismatch  is  caused  by  the  fact  that  third  decisions  are 
different (see above). If we disregard third decisions (i.e. C in the order of decisions 
ABC and A in the order CBA) we can aggregate the resulting structures with Aggr. 
AB/BA and Aggr. BC/CB in Table 3. A new estimation of (,,) for the categories ik., 
.ik, and .k. (= “Only B” in Table 3) with i,k=0,1 results in 
2 = 22.36 (df=10-3-3=4, p= 
0.0002), which constitutes no improvement. 
 
In the random parameter model, the distribution function F has a different meaning. It 
is  the  distribution  of  the  random  “emotional  state”  of  a  subject  (measured  by  his 
altruism parameter) and we assume that this state is realized by independent random 
draws of the parameter a according to the distribution F(a). Thus we get 
 
(19)                           
 
With    from (6). The other relative frequencies are determined correspondingly. The 
estimation of the parameters of the normal distribution (with the categories including 
the third decisions) results in =0.219, =0.652 and 
2 = 22.62 (df=12, p= 0.031). If 
we disregard the third decisions then we get =0.280, =0.655 and 
2 = 8.63 (df=5, 
p= 0.125). 
 
Result 5: The logit equilibrium with a linear altruistic utility function and a normal 
distribution of the altruism parameter cannot explain the structure of decisions in the 
Passing the Buck game with non-experts (p≤0.0003). A random parameter model 
with  the  same  utility  function  shows  a  far better  fit  with  the  non-expert  decisions 
(p=0.031), in particular if we disregard the third decisions of subjects (p=0.125).  23 
 
 
Let us briefly come back to the expert decisions. A problem for the adaptation of the 
two alternative models are the low frequencies of six of the eight categories (see 
Table 4). According to the marginal distributions (qA,qB,qC)=(0.95, 0.90, 0.68) of the 
experts decisions the catagories  011,  010,  001, 000 are expected to assume the 
lowest theoretical frequencies and therefore aggregated. The random utility model 
predicts again frequencies which are significantly different from the data (
2 = 7.62, 
df=1, p=0.006) and the random parameter approach fits also the expert data better 
(
2 = 4.9, df=2, p=0.086) than the random utility model. The estimated distribution of 
altruism parameters for the random parameter model is practically the same, namely 
=-0.002, =0.218, as that which was estimated from the marginal frequencies.  
 
Result 6: The expert decisions are in (weak) accordance with random parameter 





Passing the Buck need not be such a big problem as many people assume, at least 
not in our three-periods experimental game. 61% of the decisions were “fixing the 
problem”. In the last period even 71% of our subjects were ready to fix it though the 
cost of €6 were relatively high compared with the personal benefit of €8. (See the 
non-experts’ behavior in Table 2). It happened only in about 5% of the cases that a 
group of three did not fix the problem. (The appointment of an expert resulted in a 
worse average fixing probability of 84%.) This overall success is qualified, however, 
by the fact that, in the non-expert game, in only about two third of the cases (64%) 
the problem was fixed efficiently, i.e. by the first player.  
 
The explanation of behavior by the theoretical model in Section 2 is partly successful. 
The aggregate fixing probabilities in positions A, B, and C can be explained, although 
with  different  altruism  parameter  distributions  of  experts  and  non-experts.  The 
structure  of  individual  decisions  can  be  explained  by  a  random  parameter  model 
(Loomes and Sugden, 1995;  Cox et al., 2007), but not by a random utility model 
(MacKelvey and Palfray, 1995, 1998). 24 
 
 
Under  the  above  analysis  the  sole-responsibility  condition  under  which  experts 
decide seems to influence their altruism or the distribution from which their altruism 
parameter  is  drawn.  We  may  object  that,  as  a  second  difference,  the  decision 
problem  of  the  experts  is  simpler.  This  does  not  prevent,  however,  the  common 
explanation of experts and non-expert behavior by random altruism.  
 
Further insight into the decision structure should be gained from further experiments. 
Variations of the number of players and costs and benefits may help, but especially 
new  experimental  designs  (as  for  example,  the  elicitation  of  beliefs  about  others’ 
behavior) will be required.  With this proposal I Pass the Buck to other researchers. 
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(Filled in by the experimenters) 
Pseudonym: ………………… 




Three individuals A, B, C have jointly rented a machine which is used by each of 
them  for  one  day.  The  order  is  A,  B,  C.  Each  of  them  earns  €8  from  using  the 
machine. 
 
Already on the first day a problem emerges for which the renters are in change. The 
problem can be fixed 
-  by A on the first day or 
-  by B on the second day or 
-  by C on the third day or 
-  not at all. 
 
Costs for fixing are 
-  €2 on the first day 
Consequence: A earns €6, B and C earn €8 each 
-  €4 on the second day 
Consequence: A earns €8, B earns €4 (earns €8) 
-  €6 on the third day. 
Consequence: A and B earn €8 each, (earns €2) 
-  If the problem is not fixed at all, all three pay a fix of €8 and earn nothing 
 
Payoff: Random Groups of 3 will be formed. You will be randomly selected as A, B 
or C. Your payoff is according to the decision in your group.  
   28 
 
Page 2 
Decisions (Treatment 1a) 
 
 
If you are individual A, how would you decide? 
 
  I fix the problem 
(Consequence: €6 for you, €8 each of the others) 
 
  I do not fix the problem 





Personal Questionnaire  
 
Gender:       female     male 
 
Field of studies:     Business     International Business 
 Economics    Cultural Science 
 Law      others 
 
I  completed  my  university-entrance  diploma  [Abitur]  in  the  following  state  (for 




For Germans: In the last federal election I have voted for 
 
         CDU     SPD 
 Linke     Grüne 
 FDP       others/not voted 
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Page 4 
Decision (Treatment 1a) 
 
 
If A has not fixed the problem and if you are individual B, how would you decide? 
 
  I fix the problem 
(Consequence: €4 for you, €8 each of the others) 
  I do not fix the problem 
(Consequence: €8 for you or nothing for you depending on the decisions of C) 
 
[In other treatments the order of decisions was changed (see Table 1). In treatments 
1e and 1f a third decision is required (page 5). In Treatment 2 (after Treatments 1b, 




You  are  the  only  one  who  can  fix  the  problem  because  the  others  are  not 
competent enough. 
 
If you are individual A, how would you decide?  
 
  I fix the problem 
(Consequence: €6 for you, €8 for B and C) 
  I do not fix the problem 
(Consequence: zero income for all) 
 
If you are individual B, how would you decide?  
 
  I fix the problem 
(Consequence: €4 for you, €8 for A and B) 
  I do not fix the problem 
(Consequence: zero income for all) 
 
If you are individual C, how would you decide?  
 
  I fix the problem 
(Consequence: €2 for you, €8 for A and BC) 
  I do not fix the problem 
(Consequence: zero income for all) 
 
 